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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
in the case of Carroll v. Beard-Laney, Inc., the court sustained
the findings of fact of the jury.
On the other hand, in the case of Falconer v. Beard-Laney,
Inc., the court reversed the findings of fact of the Industrial
Commission, a body comparable to the jury, as to findings of
fact. Admittedly, the master will not be liable for the injury
to the servant, if the servant acts outside the scope of his
employment. The court did not in the Falconer case discuss
the fact that the Industrial Commission's findings if supported
by any evidence would be final, or the competency of evidence
presented, but paid lip service to the doctrine of burden of
proof. The court did not in the latter case overrule the previous
case either. The court had before it evidence that Falconer
was taking a route 55 miles in distance when the normal route
was 28 miles and the route he took was southwest when he
should have been returning northerly. Also in evidence was
the fact that the deceased driver stated his intention of filling
a date in York. It would seem that in either case the employee
had so departed from the scope of his employment, that the
master should not be liable.
It is submitted that if the court deemed it unconscionable
that a servant could be acting in the scope of employment
under facts such as these, the proper result would have been
an overruling of the Carroll case and a statement that these
acts were so grossly out of line with the duties conferred on
Falconer as to render him outside the scope of his employment
for all purposes.
LEON S. GOODALL
THE LAW OF LATERAL SUPPORT
The general law of lateral support is well settled in the
United States. The owner of land is entitled to have it sup-
ported in its natural condition by land of the adjoining pro-
prietor, and if such adjoining proprietor removes this sup-
port whereby the soil of the former is disturbed or falls, he
is liable for all damages so occasioned, regardless of whether
he was negligent in making the excavation.1 The nature of
1. Walker v. Strosnider, 67 W. Va. 39, 67 S. E. 1087 (1910), prob-
ably the leading case in the U. S.; Gildersleeve v. Hammond, 109 Mich.
431, 67 N. W. 519 (1896); Prete v. Cray, 49 R. I. 209, 141 Atl. 609
(1928); 59 A. L. R. 1241; 2 C. J. S., Adjoining Landowners; RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS, §817 (1939).
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this right is not defined strictly as an easement, but as an
incident to the land, a right of property necessarily and nat-
urally attached to and passing with the soil. It is a servitude
rather than a common law easement, and is an absolute right
in property.
2
Where structures have been erected on the land, however,
the rule governing lateral support is not the same, as the
absolute right to lateral support applies only to lands in their
natural condition, and does not extend to situations where
buildings or artificial structures are erected on the land.3
The rule has been stated thus: "Unless conferred by
statute or acquired by grant, the right to lateral support of
land in its natural condition does not extend to land encum-
bered by buildings or other structures which increase the
lateral pressure."4 We have no such statute in South Carolina
as referred to in the rule. Our Supreme Court has briefly
discussed the point in only two cases.5 In the Bailey case it
was sought to enjoin the adjoining landowner from excavating
up to the property line in the middle of an alley-way which
ran along the line separating the two plots of land. No exca-
vation had actually taken place. The main points of the case
dealt with easements of land and of light and air. But the
Court cited a New England case,6 and by way of a dictum
stated, "It is there shown to be the settled rule in this country
that while the soil, in its natural condition, cannot be lawfully
injured by excavation made by an adjoining proprietor on his
own land, yet for injuries done to buildings or other improve-
ments no right of action can be maintained without allega-
tions of negligence."
In the Contos case the lessees of a building sought damages
against contractors excavating on the adjoining land, alleg-
ing that the damages resulted from the grossly negligent and
reckless manner in which the excavation was done. The answer
of the contractors set up notice and contributory negligence
in the owner-lessor. The main point of the case was whether
the contributory negligence of the lessor could be imputed to
the lessees. The Court held that it could not, and in an aside
2. 2 THoMPsON, REAL PROPERTY, 602 (Perm. Ed. 1940).
3. 1 Am. Jur., Adjoining Landowners, §22.
4. 2 C. J. S., Adjoining Landowners, §6; 50 A. L. R. 487.
5. Bailey & Son v. Gray, 53 S. C. 503, 31 S. E. 354 (1898); Contos
& Metracas v. Jamison & Morris, 81 S. C. 488, 62 S. E. 867 (1908).
6. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (1877).
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cited the Bailey case and said, "It * * * is well settled
that a proprietor excavating on his own premises is liable
for damages done to the adjacent owner's soil if in its natural
condition, whether damages result from negligence or not,
but when buildings are erected upon the soil, and its natural
condition thus altered, no action lies against such excavator
except upon allegation and proof of negligence." But the
plaintiff-lessees had alleged and proved negligence, and that
point was not in issue.
Note that the language in the Bailey case says, " * * *
for injuries to buildings * * * no right of action can be
maintained without allegations of negligence," while that of
the Contos case reads, " * ** when buildings are erected
upon the soil, * * no action lies * * * except
upon allegation and proof of negligence."
Thus it would appear that the South Carolina law of
lateral support as to property upon which buildings have been
erected has been established by dicta, and an examination of
the exact language of the courts in the Bailey and Contos
cases shows the South Carolina declaration of the law on this
point to be as strict a rule as can be found, anywhere in the
United States. Interpreted, it can only mean that even though
the showing be made that the building in no way contributed
to the weight of the soil, damages cannot even be collected
for the destruction of the soil, not to mention the building, in
the absence of allegation and proof of negligence. South Caro-
lina is not alone in this declaration of the rule.
7
It appears that more just and equitable results are ob-
tainable in other jurisdictions which have qualified or modi-
fied this strict rule. Virginia, for example, says that damage
done to the buildings may be considered in estimating total
damages in cases where the land, upon which there are build-
ings, slides or subsides by reason of excavation upon the ad-
joining land and the buildings in consequence are damaged,
provided that their weight in no way contributed to the sub-
sidence of the soil.8 Since this reasoning is based on the natural
property right of the adjoining owner to lateral support, it
results in a split of authority as to whether recovery may be
had under such circumstances for both land and buildings,
7. Gilmore v. Driscoll, supra, in which the weight of the buildings in no
way contributed to the injury.
8. Stearns' Ex'r v. City of Richmond, 88 Va. 992, 14 S. E. 847 (1892).
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especially since under the general rule recovery for damages
to buildings is based on negligent excavation.
Another example is the Michigan rule stated as follows:
"(1) While a landowner has the undoubted right to excavate
close to the boundary line, he must take reasonable precau-
tions to prevent his neighbor's soil from falling. (2) If he has
taken such reasonable precautions, and yet the soil falls from
its own pressure, he is still liable for injury to the land, but
not for any injury to the superstructures. (3) If the pressure
of the superstructure causes the land to fall, he is not liable
either for injury to the land or superstructure. (4) If he fails
to take such reasonable precautions to protect his neighbor's
soil, and to preserve it in its natural state, he is liable for the
injury to both the land and the superstructure, if the pressure
of the superstructure did not cause the land to fall, and it
fell in consequence of the failure to take such reasonable pre-
cautions." 9
The liberal viewpoint is expressed in a Rhode Island case.10
The rule there set out repeats the general principle that the
right of lateral support does not include the right to have the
weight of a building placed upon the land also supported,
and that if the pressure and weight of the building cause the
land to subside the excavator is not liable for injury to the
building in the absence of a showing of negligent excavation.
But the case goes on to say that a landowner by building upon
his land has not thereby lost his right to have his soil sup-
ported, and, when that right is invaded by his neighbor, and
his land sinks, he is entitled to compensation for the direct
results of such breach of duty, including any injury to build-
ings upon his land, when such injury is due to an interference
with the lateral support of the soil, and cannot be ascribed to
the weight and pressure of the building upon the land.
The American Law Institute favors the Rhode Island view,
and expressed it as follows: "A-and B are severally in posses-
sion of lands. There is a heavy building on A's land. B makes
an excavation in his land for the purpose of building a house
thereon. A's land falls into this excavation. If A's land would
not have fallen if there had been no building on it, B is not
liable on the principle of duty to give lateral support to the
land of A. If A's land would have fallen if there had been no
9. Gildersleeve v. Hammond, supra.
10. Prete v. Cray, supra.
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building on it, B is liable "* * * for the consequential dam-
age to the buildings on the basis of removal of natural support
-not negligence.""
The rule as expressed in the Rhode Island case and by the
American Law Institute certainly is calculated to and would
result in the fairest settlement of this type of dispute. As in
other cases the testimony of experts could be utilized in de-
termining whether or not the weight of the buildings con-
tributed to the subsidence, and the final question would be
left, as it 'should be, to the jury.
Where there is definite negligence on the part of the ex-
cavator, the rule is clear. Even though the excavator is not
bound to furnish lateral support sufficient to sustain his
neighbor's land where the pressure has been increased by
buildings, he must use due care in making an excavation even
in such case, and he is liable in damages if the injury to his
neighbor was caused by the negligent and unskillful manner
in which the excavation was made or maintained. 2 This rule
is based on the idea that one must use his own property in
such a way as not to injure his neighbor, and must execute
work thereon, as far as is reasonably practicable, with a view
to the safety of the buildings on the adjoining property.13 All
the authorities agree on this. The "due care", as it is ex-
pressed, is simply the duty to proceed in an ordinarily skillful
and careful manner, exercising only reasonable and ordinary
care to prevent damage. Ordinary care and skill in excavation
and maintaining an excavation depend on the circumstances
of each particular case.
The American Law Institute says, "The elements neces-
sary to render the actor liable are: (1) The withdrawal of
the lateral support; (2) the negligent character of the with-
drawal; (3) harm to land or to artificial additions thereon
which is the legal consequence of the negligent withdrawal;
(4) absence of conduct on the part of the person suffering the
harm which disables him from maintaining an action there-
for." 14
The same work sets out specific acts of negligence as fol-
lows: "Under particular circumstances and conditions, it may
11. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §817 (2) (1939).
12. 1 Am. Jur., Adjoining Landowners, §26.
13. Walker v. Strosnider, supra.
14. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, §819 (c) (1939).
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be negligence: (1) To excavate sand, gravel, loam, or other
friable soil otherwise than in sections; (2) not to furnish
temporary support by shoring; (3) to fail to give timely and
sufficient notice of the proposed excavation; (4) to maintain
an excavation under such conditions or for such a length of
time as to expose the adjoining lands with artificial additions
to unreasonable risk of harm as by exposure to rain, frost or
weathering; (5) to make use of improper instrumentalities or
improper use of proper instrumentalities; (6) to employ in-
competent workmen; (7) to neglect to ascertain in advance
whether the excavation as planned is likely to expose adjoining
land with artificial additions to unreasonable risk of harm;
(8) to represent to the adjoining landowner that a certain
method will be followed or that certain precautions will be
taken, and thereafter without adequate notice change the
method or omit the precautions."'1
As to contributory negligence, the general trend indicates
that it will excuse the negligent excavator from liability.16
The only South Carolina case mentioning the point is Contos
& Metracas v. Jamison & Morris,17 and that case does not
actually say that contributory negligence will prevent recov-
ery. It merely indicates that such a decision would result if
contributory negligence were in issue and proved. The pres-
ence or absence of contributory negligence, like that of negli-
gence, would depend on all the facts and circumstances of
each particular case, and would be for the jury to decide.
In the final analysis, the South Carolina law of lateral
support is very limited. Only two expressions of it have come
from our Supreme Court. In the case of Bailey & Son v. Gray, 
8
there was no need to discuss it since the facts show that there
was no excavation. This expression, then, was a pure dictum.
In Contos & Metracas v. Jamison & Morris,'9 negligence was
alleged and proved, but whether or not this was necessary
to collect for damage to the artificial addition was not in issue
in the case. Again the Court declared the law on the point,
citing the Bailey case. If these expressions are considered the
settled case law of this state, we are adherents to the strict
15. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §819 (f) (1939).
16. Huber v. H. R. Douglass, Inc., 94 Conn. 167, 108 Atl. 727 (1919);
Smith v. Hardesty, 31 Mo. 411 (1861).
17. See note 5, supra.
18. See note 1, supra.
19. See note 1, supra.
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rule, discussed above. The effect of the Contos case, with a
strict interpretation of the language, is to declare as a matter
of law that any artificial structure placed upon land will in-
crease the lateral pressure to a distance sufficient to place
the area of increased pressure beyond the boundary of the ad-
joining landowner. Should this not be a question of fact for
the jury to decide? It is difficult to believe, after a thorough
study of the two South Carolina cases, that our Supreme
Court would feel itself bound to follow them. Rather, it is to
be thought, it would feel constrained, upon presentation of a
proper case, to make a full declaration of the law as to lateral
support in South Carolina, with a tendency to support the
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